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Abstract. This paper presents an out-of-equilibrium model to explain cross-country
dierences in the capacity to absorb new skill-biased technologies. The usual main-
stream viewpoint stressing the role of labour markets will be re-examined in a context
characterized by a sequential structure of both the process of production and the skill
formation, whose interaction brings about coordination failures harming the viabil-
ity of the innovation process. In this light, educational policies play a crucial role in
restoring the required coordination. The robust results of the simulations show that
educational policies appear to be important both in rigid and in 
exible systems. In
the former case, educational policies nanced by taxation allow the system to escape a
low productivity nal equilibrium. In the latter, they contrast the nancial constraint
associated to a large decrease in the unskilled wage. Altogether, a moderate degree of
rigidity seems the most appropriate institutional environment to reach the targets of
viability and of a full exploitation of the technological potential.
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1. introduction and motivation
In the last three decades, due to the sharp changes in workers' conditions, the relation
between labour market outcomes and technical change has gained a renewed interest
among scholars and policy-makers alike. Several factors have been accounted for as an
explanation of the joint emergence of labour market inequalities and of divergence in em-
ployment and productivity trends among rich countries, including technological change,
globalization and institutional dierences. The reversal in the pre-1970 convergence of
GDP per capita and productivity of the main European economies (Germany, France,
Italy) towards US levels has actually been ascribed to the dierent success in absorb-
ing new IT-related technologies (see Scarpetta et al. 2000, Krueger and Kumar 2004).
On the other hand, the skill-biasness of these technologies (Katz and Murphy 1992,
Acemoglu 1998, Krusell et al. 2000, Aghion et al. 2002) has brought about a higher
wage inequality in unregulated Anglo-Saxon countries, while lowering investments and
increasing unemployment in regulated continental Europe.
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The emergence of dierent unemployment and productivity trends in response to
common skill-biased technological shocks (Krugman 1994) is of particular interest in
our analysis. In the mainstream literature, dierential success in absorbing skill-biased
technologies has been mainly attributed to dierences in labour market institutions.
In particular, 
exibility of labour markets, i.e. low unemployment benets, absence
of ring costs and free wages xing, is acknowledged as a strong incentive to favour
innovative choices, growth and employment (Krugman 1994, Acemoglu 2003, Hornstein
et al. 2007). As a matter of fact dismissal costs (employment protection) are believed
to reduce the incentive for investment in risky, although very productive, technologies
and to help retaining human resources in low productive sectors, characterised by less
risky, routine innovations (Saint Paul 1997). In this view, the substantial skill premium
brought about by 
exible labour markets provides the right incentive to invest in general
human capital, which is more easily transferable and enables workers to operate more
eciently with new technologies (Krueger and Kumar 2004). Adequate labour market
conditions appear then as the crucial factor favouring the right coordination of household
investments in skills and of rm investments in new technologies.
However, the theoretical focus on labour market dierences alone falls short in ex-
plaining why Scandinavian countries, characterized by rigid labour market institutions,
have been able to fully reap the benets of the new skill-biased technologies. In the
mainstream literature, an interesting step forward is the paper of Krueger and Kumar
2004 where the interaction of labour market and educational policies shape the incentive
to accumulate dierent types of human capital. Moving from the Nelson and Phelps
(1966) claim that new technologies require general rather than specic education, they
show how distortive educational policies might interact with dierences in labour market
policies, hence explaining the observed dierences in the rates of accumulation of general
human capital between Germany and the US. Accordingly, the comparative advantage
of the US and Scandinavian countries over the central EU area is partially attributed
to an educational system that enhances the incentives of investing in college education
with respect to specic and vocational training
1.
In this paper we seek to investigate the way in which dierences in educational poli-
cies, and the interaction with dierent labour market institutions, aect the outcome
of a skill-biased technological transition. The eects of the interaction between labour
markets and educational policies will be considered by focussing on the feedbacks of
wage inequality|mainly determined by technology and labour market institutions|on
nal demand and on human capital accumulation throughout the emergence of nancial
constraints at the household level. The dynamic coordination of investments in human
and physical capital turns out to be aected both by the evolution of the incentives to
invest in it, as the standard view would suggest, and by the evolution of the nancial
constraint at the households and rms' level. Note that these constraints are particularly
relevant under three, rather realistic, hypotheses: 1. the assumption of cash-in-advance,
1In addition, counterfactual evidence supporting this explanation is provided by a comparative
analysis of the dynamics of the total factor productivity in two countries with similar labour market
institutions|UK and US|and a similar pattern of ICT investments, but dierent endowments of col-
lege graduates. In the nineties, the country with the larger college cohort, i.e. US, maintained a higher
rate of growth of productivity with respect to the country with a smaller graduate cohort, i.e. UK, the
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implying that costs and proceeds are not automatically synchronized; 2. the assumption
of imperfect capital markets, as is often the case in the literature on human capital, e.g.
Galor and Zeira 1993; 3. the explicit consideration of a construction phase both of skills
and physical capital, whose time dimension favours the emerging of constraints both at
the households and rms level.
We will analyse the factors that shape the critical phase of a skill-biased technological
transition from a steady state to another, and investigate the role of educational policies
and labour market 
exibility for the viability of this transition, by making use of an out-
of-equilibrium model that embodies the abovementioned hypotheses. The complexity
involved in the transitional analysis calls for non-analytical solutions whose robustness
is checked through a detailed sensitivity analysis. The robust results of the simulations
of the model show that educational policies appear to be important both in rigid and
in 
exible systems, but for dierent reasons. In the former case, educational policies
nanced by taxation speed up skill formation and thereby allow the system to escape a
low productivity nal equilibrium. In the latter, educational policies reduce the emer-
gence of nancial constraints at the household level associated to a large decrease in the
unskilled wage. Altogether, a moderate degree of rigidity seems the most appropriate
institutional environment to reach the targets of viability and of a full exploitation of the
technological potential. It will also be shown that the level of the tax required to fully
reap the benets of the skill-biased transition is increasing in the degree of labour mar-
ket 
exibility. Finally, the model identies a possible mechanism through which, in the
case of rigid labour markets, a physiological productivity slowdown that characterizes
the rst phase of a technological transition might become permanent as a consequence
of bad policy choices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the out-of-equilibrium per-
spective on innovation and skill formation. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4
investigates the outcomes of the transition and checks the robustness of the main re-
sults. Section 5 concludes.
2. innovation and skill formation: an out-of-equilibrium process
The `right' choice of technology, that is, the choice of innovative technologies, and
the incentives favouring it, are at the centre of the stage in the mainstream literature,
which supports the view that rigid labour markets hinder this choice. However, this
implies a view of production and technology according to which the productive capacity
expression of a technology and its adequate utilisation (the gains of technology) are the
automatic (immediate or delayed) result of a simple choice. A production theory of this
kind, however, is consistent only with an equilibrium context. Only in equilibrium, in
fact, it is possible to relate inputs and output on the basis of a relation dened ex ante by
technical conditions, and determine returns and productivity as the expression of these
conditions. In other words, once you are able to realise the conditions for the choice
of the highly productive technology you have the results of this choice. Co-ordination
problems, which might hamper the eective appropriation of the potential returns of
new technologies, are excluded by assumption.
However, a radical innovation necessarily implies a restructuring of productive ca-
pacity, and thus a breaking of the regular behaviour of the economy. Only by relaxing4 M. AMENDOLA{F. VONA
the assumption that the system remains in equilibrium during a technological transition
allows taking into account the dissociation in time of costs and proceeds that is the
expression of the coordination problems raised by the attempted change. And only by
re-establishing the coordination, both at the micro and the macro levels, that is neces-
sary to ensure the viability of the innovative process, it will be possible to actually obtain
the economic returns of innovation. This depends in turn on being able to re-establish a
balanced structure of productive capacity and to eliminate the market imbalances and
skill mismatches involved. This is a necessary condition for the viability of the innovation
process and the possibility to reap the advantages associated to new technologies. In this
light, technology no longer appears as the precondition of the process of innovation but
as the result of the latter, interpreted as an (essentially economic) co-ordination process
(Amendola and Gaard 1998).
The human resource plays a crucial role in this process. In particular, the role of
the human resource, as well as the working of labour markets (
exibility/rigidity, wages
policy, employment protection...) must then be looked in the perspective of the viability
of the innovation process. In this light learning appears as the main contribution of
the human resource to the process of construction/restructuring of productive capacity,
by helping to re-establish the co-ordination between the accumulation of the physical
capital and that of the human capital, broken by the skill-biased requirements of the
new technologies.
The focus on the process of learning{rather than on price mechanisms, aimed at
bringing about equilibrium between demand and supply of labour{points to the problem
of the co-ordination between the accumulation of the physical and the human capital,
that is even more relevant in relation to general purpose technologies, given their strong
and particular skill-bias. To be sure, dealing with these changes implies a high level
of general education that supplies adaptable skills (University degrees, PhDs...) rather
than vocational training (mainly based on experience) traditionally important for the
provision of specic skills (Gould 2002).
The sensibly higher costs and the longer time to obtain a degree compared to voca-
tional qualications is likely to bring about a signicant breaking of coordination between
the process of accumulation of physical capital and that of the human resource. The
latter must therefore be intensied and accelerated.
However, co-ordination problems are exacerbated by the fact that, in line with stan-
dard human capital theory (Becker 1975), rms nd it dicult to appropriate invest-
ments in general human capital, which is easy transferable across industries and rms.
Thus investments in training supported by the direct bargaining of entrepreneurial as-
sociations and unions, becomes less eective in solving emerging coordination failures
as long as these institutions tend to promote the development of a know-how enhancing
the productivity of incumbents' plants, rather than favouring the adoption of radically
new technological designs (Baumol 2004).
It has been maintained that skill premia favoured by labour market 
exibility may
provide the appropriate incentives to accumulate general human capital. On the other
hand, consistently with a signicant empirical evidence (e.g. Haveman and Wolfe 1995),
unskilled households face higher opportunity costs for investing in general education,
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markets for borrowing against future income (Galor and Zeira 1993), poor families living
on unskilled wages can not aord the xed costs|living costs and tuition fees|of long
educational programs. For example, Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) estimated a large
and signicant impact of household income on enrolment decision across three cohorts
of US high school graduates. This eect is even magnied if technical change tends to
trigger an initial productivity slowdown that amplies the reduction of the unskilled
wage. In sum, whether unemployed or less-rich, unskilled workers might face a liquidity
constraint (or a higher opportunity cost) that makes them unable (or unwilling) to aord
the long-term investment to attain a college degree, notwithstanding the incentive of high
expected skill premia.
Active educational policies appear then as the way to overcome both the lack of
incentives|typical of regulated systems|and the emergence of borrowing constraint|
typical of unregulated ones. Here we focus on higher education subsidies in order to
emphasize the possible interesting trade-os that emerge by considering the interaction
of educational policies and labour market institutions.
In this perspective, the dierential path of accumulation of higher (general) education
with respect to the US observed in many central European countries appears as the result
of lower expected returns of investments in university education in these countries, due
to the interaction of a passive tuition-free system and of rigid labour markets. On the
contrary, an aid-based system, besides osetting the decrease in the individual capacity
to invest in education, also enhances the incentive to actually carry out this investment.
A historical inspection of the U.S. policy experience suggests that the huge, and anti-
cyclical , increase in student aids in the 70s is in tune with this explanation allowing
to remove the nancial constraint of many low-middle income households (Heller 2006).
Among the policy measures that, since the end of the 60s, were taken in order to contrast
the U.S. decline in high-technological sectors (Cozzi and Impullitti 2008), the sharp
increase of investment in higher education has prepared the ground for the boom of the
ICT revolution.
The out-of-equilibrium analysis carried out in this paper enables us to stress the
importance of educational subsidies especially in the critical initial phase of technological
transitions where the worsening of the macroeconomic performance, brought about by
a diversion of resources towards construction activities, is likely to be a source of path
dependency. In particular, in the perspective proposed it will be possible to critically
re-examine the dominant conclusion as to the reasons of the transatlantic divergence{
the dierence in employment and productivity performances between the U.S. and the
main European economies, casting doubts, in particular, on the belief that rigid labour
markets are the main culprit of this divergence.
The model expounded in the next section provides the basis for the simulation analysis
whose results are presented in section 4.
3. model
This model represents an extension of the baseline model of Amendola and Gaard
(1998). With respect to that model, here the accumulation of human capital is endo-
genised and educational policies are explicitly considered.6 M. AMENDOLA{F. VONA
The evolution of the economy is sketched out by a sequence of nite periods. Three
types of agents are considered: a representative rm, skilled and unskilled workers. All
exchanges between them are intermediated by a nancial asset, call it `money': the
resources to carry out production and to sustain consumption are therefore nancial
resources, not physical output. The rm organizes production and pays prots at the
end of each nal production period as a constant fraction of the output sold. Two
types of workers, skilled and unskilled, supply inelastically each a unit of labour at the
beginning of the period. Wages are paid ex-ante and entirely spent within the period. In
turn, prots are entirely spent during the next period. Population grows at a constant
rate n and both types of workers have children with an identical fertility rate. In the
initial steady state, technical change is absent, hence the economy grows at the rate n.
At time t > 0; a skill-biased technological shock pushes the system out-of-equilibrium.
The way in which the system adjusts to this shock is analysed in the simulations of
section 4.
3.1. The Neoaustrian technology. In the representative rm production is carried
out by means of fully vertically integrated processes of a Neo-Austrian type (Hicks 1973)2,
using a heterogeneous primary input (labour). An elementary process of production
considers explicitly the time prole of inputs and outputs and is represented by an input
















u represent the requirement of skilled s and unskilled u labour, respec-
tively. Each element of these vectors denotes the specic requirement of labour in the
successive stages of the construction phase of productive capacity (from 1 to nc) and,
following it, of the utilization phase (from nc+1 to nc+nu ) during which the productive
capacity generates an output.





with bj = 0; 8j = 1;:::;nc and bj = b > 0; 8j = nc + 1;:::;nc + nu:
At each given moment t the productive capacity is subject to aging, i.e. xj(t) =
xj 1(t   1); and is represented by the intensity vector:
(3.3) x(t) = [xc(t);xu(t)];
whose elements are the number of processes in the construction c and in the utilization
u phase active at time t. The activity of construction and utilization of productive
capacity determines the vector of labour demand, whose elements are the demand for
each type of skills respectively, i.e. LD(t) = A  x(t)0.
2A Neo-Austrain representation of the production process, which allows to take explicitly into account
the phase of construction of productive capacity, is best suited to deal with the restructuring of this
capacity through which an out-of-equilibrium process like innovation takes place, and which is obscured
by the equilibrium assumption behind the standard `production function' representation of production
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In the Neo-Austrian framework, a skill-biased technology implies a relative increase
in the requirement of skilled labour with respect to unskilled labour. Clearly, when
technology is allowed to change, the matrix A is also indexed by time.
3.2. Decisions: Production and Investments. At the beginning of each period, the
representative rm faces a nancial constraint. W(t) are the funds available to nance
production processes, subject to the constraint:
(3.4) W(t) = (1   )  y(t   1) + f(t) + hf(t   1);
where y(t   1) are the past period's money proceeds and  is the xed fraction of con-
sumption out of prots, hf(t 1) are the idle money balances involuntarily accumulated
in the past, and f(t) are the external nancial resources, either subsidies or credit. In
particular, the external nancial resources are such that: f(t) = min[fS(t);fD(t)], where
fD(t) is the demand of external funds determined according to the actual investments
and production plans, and fS(t) is the money supplied by the central authority, which
we assume growing at the steady state rate n. Together with the characteristic of the
technology, the wage fund W(t) determines the desired demand of labour of each type.
While the emergence of a nancial constraint depends on the decisions of the monetary
authority, a human constraint might emerge for two reasons: full employment, or excess
demand of at least one essential skill. A human resource constraint more stringent than
a nancial resource constraint forces the rms to accumulate involuntarily idle balances:
hf(t) = max[0;W(t)   !(t)] where !(t) is the wage fund constrained by available human
resources.
In both cases in which a stringent constraint emerges, rms are forced to scrap part
of the productive capacity. This choice obviously depends on the technical coecients
dened in the matrix A. If the requirements of labour are non-negative in each phase of
production, the optimal choice is clearly to scrap rst the younger processes which are
burdened by costs but not yet bring about revenues.
The decision of how much to produce in each period depends on expectations on nal
demand. The rm adapts its capacity with respect to the expected nal demand , b D(t);
which is made to depend on past trends in money proceeds. In the case of an excess of
capacity with respect to the expected nal demand, the vector of processes in the phase
of utilization, xU(t); is scaled down uniformly by a partial utilization of the productive
capacity inherited from the past:













A where o(t) and b o(t) are respectively the real stocks actually put
back on the market and the desired level of real stocks, which is equal to zero in equilibrium and, out-of
equilibrium, is equal to a weighted average of the past levels of real stocks;  2 (0;1] is a parameter8 M. AMENDOLA{F. VONA
As a consequence, the new investments carried out (the rate of starts of new production
processes) will be the minimum between desired investments{which, for simplicity, are
assumed to grow at the steady state rate n 4{and the part of the available nancial
resources not required to carry out current production.
3.2.1. Demand and Supply. The supply of nal output S(t) in each period is equal to
the output produced in the period plus the real stocks, if any, accumulated in case of an
excess supply in the previous periods and put immediately back on the market.
The eective demand for nal output, D(t); re
ects our assumptions on the consump-
tion decisions of the various agents:
(3.6) D(t) =
!(t) + (t) + hh(t   1)
p(t)
;
where !(t) is the `constrained' wage fund (see above) entirely spent on consumption;
(t) = y(t 1) is consumption out-of-prots which is a constant fraction  of money
proceeds y(t   1) at time t   1 and is entirely consumed in period t; and hh(t   1) are
the idle balances accumulated by households in previous periods, emerging if there is an
excess of demand in the nal good market.
3.3. Markets. While production and investment decisions are updated during each
period if plans cannot be fully realized, prices change only at the junction between
periods as a consequence of the disequilibrium in the respective markets. The price of
the nal good in each period will then be:












where p is the reaction coecient expressing the degree of 
exibility of the market.
Furthermore, we exclude the possibility that, in period t; prices decrease below the
unitary cost, c(t), which is a function of the wages and of the technology.
Likewise, wages react to disequilibria in the labour market. The reaction coecient
h captures the degree of labour market rigidity, within the range of two polar cases: a
purely market-based determination of wages, i.e. h ! 1, and an institutionally driven
rule, h = 0.







h (t 1) and LS
h(t 1) are respectively the demand
and the supply of labour of type h at time t   1. Wage rigidity can be the consequence
that captures the elasticity of the degree of utilization to unexpected changes in the desired level of real
stocks.
4This is obviously a limitation of the model. The assumption of more realistic decision rules, with,
e.g., the rate of start directly depending on the expected nal demand, tends to generate the well-known
instability of post-keynesian growth models. However, simulations available on request show that, within
a certain range, our results are robust if we consider a decision rule for the rate of start which is a linear
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of many factors, ranging from union monopoly power to eciency wages, from market
incompleteness to fairness considerations (see Howitt 2002). The parameters h turn
out to be very important in the following discussion. We further assume that there is a
lower bound for the unskilled wage that equals the basic wage: wu(t) = w(t).
3.4. Endogenous formation of skills. We assume that becoming skilled is equivalent
to attain an educational program, which lasts for one year and costs % per person, and
that skilled workers can perform unskilled jobs while the opposite is not true. Moreover,
individuals have equal innate abilities, but they dier as regard to preferences towards
leisure and the time prole of income revenues. That is, given the wage premium equal
to the dierence between the skilled and the unskilled wage, ws wu, only a fraction  of
individuals is well disposed to attend an educational program giving up incomes during
the educational period. The higher the wage premium, the higher the fraction : For
sake of simplicity, we further assume that  is equal to the normalized wage premium
as long as the unskilled wage remains above a minimum wage. More formally:
(3.9) e (t) =
(
ws(t) wu(t)
ws(t)+wu(t) if wu(t) > w(t)
1 if wu(t) = w(t)
Since in this work we will mainly interpret w(t) as a basic or subsistence wage, it is
natural to maintain that w(t) changes with prices gp: w(t) = w(t 1)(1+gp). It is easy
to show that this functional specication is more sensible to a decrease of the unskilled
wage than to an increase in the skilled one. This implies that human capital investments
have a precautionary element (Gould 2002), being a reaction to the risk of deterioration
of the unskilled level of well-being.
As to rms' decisions, in the case in which a stringent liquidity constraint emerges,
individuals' decisions to invest in human capital can not be realized. Provided that
the cost of education is equal to the basic wage plus the fee, an unskilled ospring
can nancially support education only if the unskilled wage is at least equivalent to
the cost of education plus the minimum requirement for parents' subsistence: wu(t) >
ce(t) + w(t) = 2  w(t) + %:
If the liquidity constraint is stringent, i.e. wu(t) < 2  w(t) + %; an unskilled worker,
who at the new wage premium wants to shift, is able to become skilled only if the cost of
education is subsidized (with the amount of the individual subsidy equal to the dierence
wu(t)   (2  w(t) + %)).
3.5. The Educational Policy. We assume that educational policies are nanced by a
tax in order to keep the government budget balanced. For sake of simplicity, we consider
only a tax on rms' idle balances, which are a direct consequence of the emergence of
a stringent human constraint. This tax meets the requirement of being 
exible. In
fact, once a skill mismatch occurs, rms involuntarily accumulate idle balances that
are automatically reinvested if, and when, the human constraint is relaxed. While the
skill mismatch is gradually reabsorbed, idle balances are gradually decumulated and the
eect of the policy disappears. The supply of educational funds is then equal to:
(3.10) KS
e (t) =   hf(t   1);
where  is the tax rate.10 M. AMENDOLA{F. VONA
The emergence of idle balances{as in the opposite case the credit rationing{signals a
break in the complementary accumulation of human and physical capital. In this model,
changes in the level of the tax reestablish this complementarity: a task assured in other
similar models by monetary policy (Amendola and Gaard 1998) or, in the standard
literature, by a continuous optimization process (e.g. Galor and Moav 2006). Together
with the parameters capturing the degree of labour market rigidities, the level of the tax
captures institutional features in this framework. Given the supply of education funds,
the eective amount of funds mobilized in each period is:




e (t) is the aggregate demand of subsidies5. By assuming that subsidies mainly
cover living expenditures, the educational policy modies the level of nal demand:
(3.12) D(t) =





In the next section, we will present the results of the simulation analysis.
4. Simulation analysis
We consider initial steady states where the nancial constraint for unskilled workers
is not binding, i.e. wu(0)   w(0) is large enough (recall that this distance determines
the capacity of accumulating human capital). This is a realistic assumption looking at
western countries before the ICT shock. To simplify matters, we assume that techni-
cal change is exogenous and consists of a single shock6. This is skill-biased and also
forward-biased, that is: an increase in the requirements of skilled workers occurs in the
construction phase (R&D, design, etc.) and is more than compensated by a decrease
in the requirement of unskilled workers, mainly concentrated in the utilization phase.
The robustness of the results of our analysis will be checked with respect to more or less
strong technological shocks and to dierent institutional congurations, dened by the
parameters capturing labour market rigidities (s;u) and educational policies ().
Section 4.1 discusses the issue of the viability of the skill-biased transition, while
section 4.2 analyses the outcomes in terms of nal productivity. In section 4.3, we
introduce the educational policy.
4.1. Viability. The viability of the technological transition is crucially aected by the
initial distance between the unskilled and the basic wage. In the case of a relatively
high initial distance, the system reaches a new steady state characterized by a higher
level of income per-capita. The transition to the new equilibrium is characterized by
a phase of cyclical 
uctuations that are brought about by the interplay of disequilibria
5In particular, three groups demand subsidies: 1. the unskilled ospring if wu(t) < 2w(t)+%; 2. the
unskilled workers that at the new wage premium want to acquire skills, 3. the ospring of unemployed
workers.
6The case in which technical change takes place as a sequence of small shocks rather than as a once-
for-all shock would require a considerable amount of additional structure since, in this case, shocks could
not be considered as completely unexpected and hence endogenous technological adoption should be
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in the labour and the nal product markets, and are amplied by lags in the adjust-
ment of skills and of the productive capacity (g. 1). On the other hand, a system
where initially the unskilled wage is too close to the basic wage has less chances to
successfully carry on the technological transition. Following the skill-biased shock, the
unskilled wage might decline below a critical level that enables unskilled households to
self-nance education investments. Notwithstanding the high incentives to accumulate
human capital, represented by the skill premium, the income eect prevails and hence
human capital accumulation shrinks. As a result, skill mismatches are not reabsorbed,
whereas unemployment and high wage inequality persist (g. 2).
More formally put: the dynamical system characterized in section 3 has a bifurcation
in correspondence to the initial level of wu(0)   w(0). This implies that, given wu(0),





the system is not viable, while if w(0) 2 [0;w(0)) viability is ensured.
In gure 2, repeated series of simulations gives a graphical interpretation of w(0), seen
the locus separating the viable and the unviable regions.
Labour market parameters s and u aect the critical value w(0) to which corre-
sponds a qualitative change in the behaviour of the system. In particular, consistently
with previous works in the out-of-equilibrium literature (e.g. Amendola, Gaard and
Saraceno 2004), systems characterized by 
exible labour markets face additional dicul-
ties in carrying on successfully the transition. Since the initial decrease of the unskilled
wage is larger in 
exible labour markets, adjusting to skill-biased innovations is pos-
sible only when the unskilled parental capacity to nance education is large enough;
otherwise, the cost of education can not be aorded by unskilled parents. To a certain
extent, instead, rigid labour markets prevent that a large initial increase of inequality
harms skill formation. To be sure, under the restriction that labour markets and the
nal product market are homogeneous p = f+(s)7, repeated long-run simulations show
that the more rigid the labour markets, the larger the set of values of w(0) compatible
with the system's viability and hence the higher can be the threshold value w(0) (g.
3).
The shape of the relationship between w(0) and the degree of labour market 
exibility
remains robust to a quasi-montecarlo experiment where the long-run outcomes of 5000
randomly extracted congurations of the relevant parameters are analysed (g. 4). More
precisely, the percentage of viable cases more than halves when moving from extremely
rigid to extremely 
exible labour markets (tab.1, col. 1 and g. 5). As an additional
check, probit regressions permit to further disentangle the eect of the dierent factors
aecting the viability of the transition. All coecients are signicant at :01% and of
the expected sign in dierent specications of the econometric relationship (tab. 2); in
particular, higher skill-biasness, basic wage and degree of labour market 
exibility all
strongly reduce the probability that a transition is viable. By comparing the size of the
coecients, product market 
exibility appears to be almost irrelevant for the viability;
7It is worthwhile noticing that rigidities in the skilled and the unskilled labour markets play an
asymmetric role provided that the emergence of a stringent liquidity constraint depends essentially on
the evolution of the unskilled wage, while the dynamic of the incentive eect is also related to the one
of the skilled wage. As a matter of fact, simulations conrm that the more 
exible the unskilled labour
market, the harder the technological transition, whereas the opposite holds for the skilled labour market.12 M. AMENDOLA{F. VONA
however, as it will be shown, this is not the case if we evaluate the transition in terms
of nal productivity.
4.2. Productivity. Among the viable cases, the outcomes of the transition can sub-
stantially dier in terms of nal productivity. The convergence to the potential level
of productivity of the new technology may not be ensured even when, in the long-run,
skill mismatches are reabsorbed. A continuum of nal steady states with dierent nal
productivities emerges since Keynesian feedbacks from demand expectations to produc-
tivity, via capacity utilization, interact with a sequential structure of production. More
to the point, the initial productivity slowdown, brought about by the interaction of
cash-in-advance constraints and of costly construction phases8, can worsen nal demand
expectations, hence leading to capacity under-utilization.
Interestingly, we found that this eect is much stronger in rigid labour markets. Using
the previous randomly generated dataset, the percentage of viable cases with a level of
the nal productivity ratio{i.e. the ratio between the eective and the nal steady state
productivity{above .95 increases with the degree of labour market 
exibility (tab. 1
col. 2). Extremely rigid systems display both a signicantly higher probability of being
viable and a signicantly lower probability of reaching a `high productivity' nal steady
state. Note that, in rigid labour markets, there is a slower initial skill formation due to
a lack of incentives (g. 6). This protracts the initial output decline and might generate
a lower nal demand, even when skill mismatches are reabsorbed. Overall, the unique
institutional conguration able to meet both the target of a viable transition and that
of a high productivity nal steady state seems to be the one associated with moderate
degrees of rigidity (g. 7).
It is worth noticing that the negative eect of demand expectations tends to be
stronger when prices are prevented from declining up to the point where the level of
demand can entirely absorb the higher potential supply. In rigid price settings, it is the
degree of capacity utilization which is forced to accommodate for quantity disequilibria
bringing about, in the long run, a lower level of real wages and of overall spending ca-
pacity9. It follows that higher competition in the product market should improve nal
productivity especially in systems with rigid labour markets. This is actually the case:
the estimated impact of price 
exibility on productivity is positive and strongly signi-
cant everywhere, but in rigid and moderately-rigid labour market congurations it is two
to four times higher than in more 
exible ones (tab. 3). The eect of a greater product
market 
exibility is magnied in moderately-rigid labour markets where a "reform" of
product market has a larger impact on productivity than a "reform" of labour markets.
Finally, gures 8-11 show that, in rigid labour markets, both the level of the nal pro-
ductivity ratio and its cumulated value{i.e. the cumulated of all the ratio experienced
8A fall in output and the appareance of technological unemployment due to the phase of construction
of productive capacity during which inputs are required but output not yet accrues, is analysed and
proved in the literature on the "machinery eect" and the "productivity paradox" (Hicks 1973, Amendola
and Gaard 1998, Amendola, Gaard and Saraceno 2005).
9Notice the parallell with the models of Caballero and Hammour (1998) and Hornstein et al. (2007):
rigid labour markets prevent wages from declining at the begininning of the transition, but this ends up
damaging the working-class in the long-run. Simulations available upon request show that workers' real
wages decline in the case of rigid labour and product markets.TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSITIONS AND EDUCATIONAL POLICIES 13
during the transition{tend to improve by increasing the coecient of product market
regulation from 0:1 to 0:310.
A straightforward interpretation of our ndings shows that the nal outcome of the
transition can be a `lower steady state' insofar as markets, included the nal one, are
too rigid. On the other hand, slower changes in wages, brought about by rigid labour
markets, appear to enable a successful transition even if the unskilled wage is relatively
close to the basic level, and thus the social capacity of accumulating human capital tends
to deteriorate much faster. As a result of these contrasting forces, extreme institutional
congurations tend to hinder the diusion of the new technology.
4.3. Policy Analysis. It has been shown that, due to the emergence of a binding -
nancial constraint for unskilled households, market forces alone might not be able to
restore a balanced accumulation of human and physical capital. In this situation, sub-
sidizing education is the main candidate policy in order to ensure a viable technological
transition. The role of public policies turns out to be of paramount importance in the
initial phase of the transition in which counter-cyclical policy interventions should be
designed in order to mitigate the potentially harmful eect of the output decrease, which
is magnied here by the eect of skill-biased technologies on unskilled wages.
In order to analyse the eect of the educational policy{nanced through a tax on rms'
idle balances, that is: funds subtracted to the nancing of the production process due to
some binding constraint on productive resources{we let the tax to vary in the interval
(0;0:9) and draw randomly the other parameters so as to obtain a new articial sample
of 22050 observations. The rst important result is that, for initially unviable systems,
there exists an appropriate internal level of the policy that maximizes the probability
of re-establishing the co-ordintation between investments in physical and human capital
(tab.4 and g.12). If taxes are relatively low, the educational policy does not allow
relaxing the nancial constraint at the household level. On the other hand, excessive
taxes reduce the free funds of rms and hence the capacity to adjust investments when
macroeconomic conditions improve.
Particularly interesting for the explanation of cross-country dierences in the capacity
to absorb skill-biased shocks is assessing the eect of the educational policy in dierent
labour markets. For the unviable cases, the table in gure 12 shows that the level of the
tax which maximizes the probability of being viable tends to increase with the degree
of labour market 
exibility. Put dierently, the minimum tax rate required to assure
the viability of the transition increases with the degree of 
exibility{as more 
exible
systems are more likely to be unviable. This points to a set of "optimal" institutional
congurations in which labour market rigidities and the public spending in education
are, to a certain extent, substitutes. In particular, the adverse eect of labour market

exibility on skill formation can be reduced by increasing educational expenditures (g.
10This result is to a certain extent consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Fiori et al.
(2007). Using a panel of Oecd countries over the period 1980-2002, they show that, if the nal market is
more competitive and characterized by lower entry barriers, the unemployement rate tends to decrease
more in rigid labour markets than in 
exible ones. Therefore, accounting for the interactions of market
imperfections leads to the conclusion that labour and nal market deregulation are in a certain sense
`substitutes'. Here a similar conclusion holds for the relation between the nal level of productivity and
income per capita, on the one hand, and the interaction of market imperfections, on the other.14 M. AMENDOLA{F. VONA
13). In the US, the large increase in student aids during the 70s might have prevented
that the observed reduction in the unskilled real income brought about a lower enrollment
rates and educational attainments of this group. Although not directly, this policy
supported the large scale diusion of skill-biased technologies during the 90s.
The educational policy turns out to be important also in rigid systems. A tax on idle
balances allows to contrast the decline of aggregate demand, sustaining a higher degree
of capacity utilization both in the short- and in the long-run. In the short-run, idle
funds are used to nance subsidies for education that represent additional consumption
expenditures. In the long-run, as the demand of educational funds gradually decreases
and the skill mismatch is reabsorbed, these funds are automatically reinvested in physical
capital. To quantify the eect of the policy, we estimate the impact on productivity of a
the tax for dierent labour market congurations under the restriction of homogeneity
of product and labour markets p = f+(s). In line with previous analyses, the impact
on productivity is maximized in moderately-rigid labour markets whereas, in very rigid
labour markets, subsidies to education have a much smaller impact than labour market
reforms (tab. 5).
This latter scenario seems to reinforce our explanation of why central European coun-
tries fail to reap the full gains of the ICT revolution. Grounding on an equal income
distribution and on its public educational system{factors that in principle tend to favour
skill formation{large European economies tend to ignore the fact that, even in more so-
cially protected systems, some individuals are harmed by the transition and require
targeted policy measures that make them able to aord the cost of higher education.
5. conclusions
This work is a rst attempt to address by means of a heterodox approach some of
the most relevant issues for labour market inequalities, skill-biased technical change
and productivity dynamics. In particular, our analysis has provided new insights on
the explanation of the cross-country divergence in the capacity to absorb skill-biased
technologies. Moreover, unlike in the standard literature on the productivity paradox
(e.g. Greenwood and Yorukoglu 1997), the length and the persistency of low produc-
tivity levels has emerged as a consequence of policy failures and particular institutional
congurations.
Our model has proved to be consistent with Krueger and Kumar (2004) explanation
of the transatlantic divergence since, in most cases, the transition to the new technology
is viable only if an increase in public investments in general and higher education com-
pensates for a decreasing capacity of investing in education among the unskilled workers.
In particular, an out-of-equilibrium analysis enables us to stress the importance of ed-
ucational policies especially in the critical initial phase of the technological transition.
In the U.S., counter-cyclical policy interventions such as student aids and investments
in higher education were probably essential in the 70s to contrast the initial decrease of
unskilled wages induced by the joint eect of the ICT revolution and of several adverse
shocks, like the oil crisis.
Moreover, looking at the interaction between educational policies and labour market
institutions, policy interventions appear important both in rigid and in 
exible systems,
but for dierent reasons. In the former case, educational policy speeds up skill formationTECHNOLOGICAL TRANSITIONS AND EDUCATIONAL POLICIES 15
and thereby allows the system to escape a low productivity nal equilibrium. In the lat-
ter, educational policy reduces the high degree of economic turbulence which in 
exible
systems tends to characterize both the phase of the transition and the nal attractor.
Altogether, a moderate degree of rigidity seems the most appropriate institutional envi-
ronment to reach the targets of viability and of a full exploitation of the technological
potential.
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Appendix A
Range of parameters for the robustness analysis: the size of technological shocks
measured as the input/output ratio varies between [1,1.4]; the degree of skill-biasness
between [.99,1.84]; the degree of 
exibility in labour markets between [.05,.82]; the degree
of product market 
exibility between [.1, .4]; the initial basic wage, given the unskilled
wage, between [.16,.467]. In random experiments, all parameters are extracted fromTECHNOLOGICAL TRANSITIONS AND EDUCATIONAL POLICIES 17
uniform distributions. Further information about the descriptive statistics of our samples
are available upon request by the authors.
The benchmark values of the technological parameters for the single run simulations
are: ac
s = 2:4965; au
s = 1:6644; ac
u = 6; au
u = 4; e ac




u = 5:3; e au
u = 2:6; b = e b = 15; nc = 2; nu = 2; whereerefers to the new values of the
technological parameters. The productivity index is the ratio between input used and





















































































Table 1. Summary: viability and product.18 M. AMENDOLA{F. VONA

























































































































Figure 4. viable random shock
Figure 5. Viability and LM 
ex20 M. AMENDOLA{F. VONA
Table 2. Determinants of Viability. Notation: bs= basic, pm and lm

ex=product and labour market 
exibility, tech shock= size of the shock,
















































Figure 6. Fraction of skilled workers after 30 runs
Figure 7. Viable cases with high nal prod.22 M. AMENDOLA{F. VONA























































































































































































Figure 11. nal prod. if p = :3 after 400 runs
Table 4. Tax and LM 
ex, initially unviableTECHNOLOGICAL TRANSITIONS AND EDUCATIONAL POLICIES 25





















unviable without the tax

Figure 12. Viable as a function of the tax26 M. AMENDOLA{F. VONA















































































Figure 13. Example of dynamics in 
ex LM plus tax
Table 5. Productivity and educational policy